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FOREWORD
The U.S. Government is very much aware of the current crises
afflicting the Third World. All of these severe problems need to be
effectively addressed through informed policy decisions. Because of this
mandate, policymakers, defense professionals, and strategic thinkers are
debating questions about the Third World as they strive to develop
appropriate American strategies for the future.
In this study, the author examines the problems of the Third World
and the debates that exist regarding the most effective U.S. response to
these problems. He has concluded that the Third World is undergoing such
significant change that most of the basic assumptions undergirding past
and current U.S. policy are no longer viable. He urges a fundamental and
radical revision of our national strategy toward the Third World, and
recommends a future strategy that would see far more selective and
discrete involvement in these staggering problems.
If our national leaders accept his theories concerning failed
states, they will be less inclined to attempt active intervention on a
scale that approximates the current level of U.S. involvement. The
United States will, in effect, disengage from large segments of the
Third World, with only carefully selected humanitarian or ecological
relief operations being executed. Such a strategy would, of course, have
profound implications for the U.S. military and would require
adjustments in force structure and operational directives concerning the
application of military power in pursuit of national interests.
During times of strategic transition, "muddling through" is not
enough: basic concepts must be rigorously examined and debated. The
Strategic Studies Institute sees this study as a means of supporting the
process of developing a coherent post-cold war strategy for dealing with
the Third World as it will be, not as it was.
JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Since the end of the cold war, the Third World has moved from the
periphery to the center of American national security strategy. As the
basic assumptions of past strategy become obsolete, debate rages over
future U.S. strategy in the Third World. The outcome of this will have
immense implications for the military.
Debate in Three Dimensions.
The current debate over U.S. strategy in the Third World takes
three dimensions:
• Debate over the extent of American involvement in the Third
World (isolationism versus engagement);
• Debate over the basic philosophy of American engagement
(idealism versus realism); and
• Debate over the form of American engagement (unilateralism
versus multilateralism).
Future strategy will be shaped by the outcome of these debates.
The Changing Face of Security.
To make sense, future American strategy must be based on trends in
the Third World. Current trends point toward a grim future characterized
by:
• A reversal of the recent trend toward democracy;
• Instability, ungovernability, and, in some cases, anarchy;
• Economic stagnation and ecological decay;
• Primalism; and,
• The increasing importance of new security threats and new types
of forces to confront them.
The Third World itself will split into a "third tier" of violent,
ungovernable regions and a "second tier" which faces severe security
problems but will be able to preserve some degree of stability. In the
third tier, the extreme of ungovernability will be "failed states" with
a total breakdown of order and civil administration, but many other
states will see ungovernability ebb and flow, with parts of their
territory permanently beyond government control.
A Strategy for the Future.
To meet the challenges of this new security environment, U.S.
strategy for the Third World must be modified. A primary feature should
be substantial disengagement, especially from the volatile third tier.
We should promote human rights, but with modest expectations. Ecological
sanity will also become an important objective. Proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction will affect nearly all strategic decisions.
v

Military Implications.
Over the next 10 years, the chance of major American involvement
in sustained land warfare in the Third World will drop to near zero. The
most likely opponents will be gray area organizations, primal militias,
warlord armies, and, for the short term, unstable "backlash states." To
meet these future threats, the U.S. military must be able to perform
both offensive and defensive missions. Offensive missions will include:
• Humanitarian and ecological relief and intervention;
• Strikes to punish enemies or enforce international actions; and,
• Traditional special operations.
Defense missions will include:
• Immigration control;
• Counter-terrorism;
• Force protection during ecological and humanitarian missions;
and,
• Strategic defense against weapons of mass destruction.
The dominant branches of the future U.S. Army will be Special Operations
Forces, Military Police, Military Intelligence, Aviation, and Air
Defense Artillery.
Conclusions.
For the next decade, the Third World security situation is likely
to undergo phased transition. Initially nation-states will still remain
the most important political units and backlash states with large
conventional militaries will pose the greatest danger. As a result, the
conventionally-configured U.S. military will remain important.
Eventually the Third World will enter a new phase. The third tier will
disintegrate into ungovernability while nation-states and conventional
militaries decline in significance. At that point, the primary forms of
security forces will be militias, private armies, armed corporations. In
preparation, U.S. forces should undergo substantial strategic
disengagement. When our involvement is necessary for humanitarian and
ecological relief, we can only be effective if we have undertaken a
radical restructuring of our security forces. This includes not only
reorganization and changed emphasis within the military, but also
alterations of the fundamental relationship of the U.S. military and the
nonmilitary elements of our security and intelligence forces.
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AMERICA IN THE THIRD WORLD:
STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS
Introduction.
With the end of the cold war, the Third World became the
centerpiece of American national security strategy. Europe remains
important, but the thorniest security issues--U.N. peace operations,
Haiti, Somalia, Iraq, North Korea, proliferation--are Third World
problems. "Major regional conflicts" in the Third World have become the
1
basic conceptual building block of U.S. military strategy.
Unfortunately, though, the elevation of the Third World from the
periphery to the center of U.S. national security strategy has not yet
stoked a fundamental reexamination of the way we understand this part of
the world. Today we face new problems armed with old ideas.
In a sense, it is difficult to consider the Third World a single
entity. Certainly every Third World problem is enmeshed in a web of
particulars. In Bosnia, for instance, policymakers must consider a
thousand years of ethnic conflict, the legacy of World War II, the
sensitivities of friendly Islamic states, and the debate over the future
of NATO. Somalia is, perhaps, even more complex. A bewildering pattern
of clan relations is blended with the residue of superpower competition
and then combined with questions concerning the reconstruction of
"failed states" and charges by African-American leaders that the United
States historically ignores Africa. The list goes on: every real or
potential problem, every conflict, is unique.
Faced with this complexity, it is easy to take an astrategic
approach to the Third World, focus on particulars, sink into
issue-relativism, and conclude that nothing learned in one region
applies to another. But to do so is dangerous. The result is a garbled
and incoherent policy unable to garner adequate domestic support.
Without losing sight of particulars, the United States must approach the
diverse parts of the Third World with a workable set of concepts,
assumptions, values, techniques, and parameters, all forming the common
language used by policymakers and the public to debate alternative
approaches to specific issues. We need, in other words, a coherent
strategy for the Third World, however broad and general.
Today, it is almost banal to note that every dimension of our
national security strategy requires rethinking. But as a torrent of
global change washed away old strategic assumptions, the Third World was
largely ignored. This is understandable: other issues had to be
confronted first. But the fact remains that most foreign policy crises
2
since World War II have originated in the Third World.
To the extent
that our strategy in the Third World has been analyzed at all,
policymakers, political leaders, defense professionals, and strategic
analysts have assumed that most of our past strategy remains valid. All
that is needed is adjustment--perhaps a little disengagement in
particular regions, or a diminution of security assistance. Such
tweaking of past strategy, however, is inadequate. The pace of change in
the Third World is electric, the effect revolutionary. Our strategy must
reflect this. What is needed, then, is strategic entrepreneurship to
transcend old ideas or, at least, set the stage for transcendence.
Future U.S. strategy in the Third World must incorporate emerging
1

concepts such as ecological security, gray area threats, and primalism.
For the U.S. military, the implications of such new ideas are immense.
Debate in Three Dimensions.
The evolution of American foreign policy and national security
strategy has always followed a distinctly dialectical pattern. Debate on
key concepts or issues leads to a loose consensus which then shapes
day-to-day policy. This consensus determines not only how "in-basket"
problems are handled, but what sorts of problems enter the in-basket. At
some point, change in the global security environment or in domestic
politics undercuts the consensus and sparks new debate. Eventually, a
new consensus emerges. Today, the cold war consensus that guided
American strategy in the Third World is shaken. Debate is raging in
three dimensions, all reflecting disagreements with deep roots in our
history. The eventual outcome--the new consensus--will form the
foundation of our future national security and military strategy.
The first dimension of debate concerns the extent of American
involvement in the world. The extreme positions are represented by
isolationism and globalism. Until the 20th century, the United States
followed a form of isolationism based on avoiding the political
struggles of the European powers. The rationale for this was both
philosophical and practical. Isolationism reflected the perception of
American "specialness." We were a representative democracy based on open
discussion of political issues and rule by the majority. Traditional
statecraft, by contrast, was a game played by aristocratic elites. Its
folkways were subterfuge and secrecy, its practice amoral. Beginning at
least with Thomas Jefferson, many Americans believed that this moral
superiority justified isolationism.3 Since conflict, according to this
argument, invariably settles at the ethical level of the more
unscrupulous antagonist, to become involved in European statecraft would
embroil us in its Machiavellianism. At the same time, isolationism also
had a more practical motive. Taking sides would alienate potential
customers for our exports and require increased military spending. This
final point was particularly worrisome: to most Americans, large
standing armies seemed incompatible with representative democracy.
By the end of the 19th century, the consensus undergirding
isolationism was eroding. Economics was the driving force. Facing a
serious and sustained economic depression in the 1890s, American
business and political leaders concluded that prosperity was contingent
on access to overseas markets. Continued isolationism might allow the
Europeans to carve the entire world into colonial empires and exclude or
greatly curtail American exports. This would pose a danger not only to
our economy, but also to our political system. Economic slumps always
spawned political radicalism. Toward the end of the 19th century, this
took a new, dangerous form as European immigrants brought socialism to
the United States. The apparent solution was a more active foreign
policy aimed at protecting access to overseas markets. This desire to
nurture American business led us to acquire our own colonial empire and
militarily intervene in the Caribbean, Central America, and Asia, thus
establishing a tradition that eventually shaped our Third World
strategy.
World War I was a major blow to isolationism--a "shove from Mars"
in Selig Adler's phrase.4 The Second World War applied the coup de grace
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and most Americans concluded that only regular and extensive U.S.
involvement in great power politics could prevent major conflict. In
addition, most Americans believed the United States had a moral destiny
to shape global politics.5 The result was abandonment of isolationism
and, eventually, the embrace of global activism. As John Kennedy
committed the United States to "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any
hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe," Americans assumed an
interest in every corner of the world. The Vietnam War and the economic
problems of the 1970s tempered globalism, but our strategists continued
to find national interests in places like Angola and Afghanistan that
19th century American leaders had probably never heard of.
During the cold war, U.S. foreign and national security policy was
never purely isolationist or globalist, but reflected a shifting balance
between the two. Today, the appropriate mix is again the subject of
debate.6 For the first time since World War II, isolationism is
receiving serious support. In fact, Alan Tonelson argues that debate
between internationalists and a new breed of isolationists he calls
"minimalists" will dominate the foreign policy agenda during the coming
years.7 Minimalists range from populist politicians such as Ross Perot
and Patrick J. Buchanan to foreign policy analysts such as Ted Galen
Carpenter.8 Underlying their thinking is the belief that the Soviet
threat forced a degree of insolvency on American strategy as commitments
exceeded resources. Today the demise of the Soviet threat allows a
9
diminution of commitments and a return to solvency.
One important
subcategory of minimalists supports U.S. engagement in Europe and the
developed parts of Asia, but sees little rationale for extensive
involvement in the Third World. Stephen Van Evera and Benjamin C.
Schwarz represent this school.10 Internationalism is advocated by most
of the traditional foreign policy elite, including President Clinton,
most of Congress, and much of the media. In response to Van Evera and
other critics of U.S. engagement in the Third World, writers such as
Steven David contend that the United States does have serious (if not
vital) interests which must be actively promoted.11 Some analysts
believe that the world is moving toward division into great trading
blocs, with the European Community destined to dominate Europe and
Africa and Japan to control Asia. The future of the United States, they
contend, lies with closer political cooperation and economic integration
in the Western Hemisphere.12 Engagement in Latin America, then, is
justified, while we should disengage from much of the rest of the Third
World. In general, internationalism currently has greater support than
minimalism or isolationism. While it might seem that Kennedy-style
globalism is dead, Grant Hammond's contention is that "Humanitarian
intervention is the Bush-Clinton version of `paying any price, bearing
any burden' in the 1990s."13 Clearly some new balance must be found
between global engagement and disengagement.
The second great debate in American foreign and national security
policy concerns the basic philosophy undergirding our approach to the
world, especially how we define national interests. One alternative is
realism. This is the descendent of the sort of conservatism developed by
philosophers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes. While there has always been
a strain of conservatism in American politics, the realist approach to
national security grew out of efforts by political scientist Hans
Morgenthau and his followers to apply the wisdom of traditional European
statecraft to U.S. foreign policy. This heritage is reflected in the
assumptions of political realism. Most basic is the belief that the
3

currency of international politics is power. "Interest defined in terms
of power," Morgenthau suggested, "helps political realism find its way
14
through the landscape of international politics."
This is immutable.
"For better or worse," according to Owen Harries and Michael Lind,
"international politics remains essentially power politics..."15 A
coherent strategy matches power and geostrategic interests which include
tangible concerns such as access to sea lanes or raw materials and
intangible objectives, especially preservation of a balance among the
world's great powers. Realism also assumes that nations have discernable
hierarchies of interests. The intensity of an interest determines how
much and what kind of national power should be used to protect or
promote it.
Because national power is so valuable, it must be husbanded and
dispersed frugally. A state should only use it in pursuit of truly
important things--a line of reasoning that led Morgenthau to oppose
American involvement in Vietnam. This frugality leads realists to accept
diversity in the domestic arrangements of states. What should determine
U.S. policy toward a nation is its foreign policy and external behavior.
Realists also believe statesmen must tolerate some instability. Since
power in the international system is dispersed, conflict is inevitable.
It can be controlled or managed, but not abolished. The major method of
controlling conflict is the balance of power. Maintaining this is an
extremely important national interest.
While realists recognize that the Third World has been the source
of most instability and conflict in the modern world, they consider it
unimportant. The ability of a state to cause damage is proportionate to
its power. Great powers can cause great damage and minor powers only
minor damage (so long as great powers recognize the systemic
insignificance of minor powers and act accordingly). From the
perspective of the international system, Third World states have little
power, so to place too much emphasis on controlling conflict among them
neglects the rule of strategic frugality and wastes valuable power.
Furthermore, most Third World conflict cannot be resolved at a
reasonable cost. Realists, then, seek to minimize the impact of conflict
in the Third World--particularly internal conflict--and conflict between
great powers and minor ones on the central balance of power. Unless a
Third World state has some special geostrategic significance such as
location on a key line of communication, possession of a valuable
resource, or the potential to upset the great power balance (perhaps
using nuclear weapons), the United States should limit engagement.
Idealists, by contrast, accord the Third World a pivotal position
in international security. For them, the primary currency of world
politics is not national power, but fundamental values such as
individual liberty, political rights, democracy, and economic freedoms.
Where realists see conflict in the international system as inevitable,
idealists believe it can be transcended. The roots of idealism, then,
are found in the liberal tradition of the Western Enlightenment,
especially Immanuel Kant, John Locke, Thomas Jefferson, John Stuart
Mill, and, more recently, Woodrow Wilson. Global conflict, according to
idealists, arises from the absence or repression of fundamental values;
democracies seldom or never make aggressive war. The foreign policy of a
state directly mirrors its domestic arrangements, so regimes such as
Iraq or North Korea that repress their own people are often externally
aggressive as well. The cure is transformation of global politics.
4

To foster the peaceful resolution of international conflict,
idealists favor strengthening international law and organizations. This
must be supported by active efforts to promote fundamental rights within
states. For idealists, this is not only morally satisfying, but also has
practical security benefits. Since conflict--whether between states or
within them--is merely a symptom of some deeper problem, idealists
believe root causes rather than manifestations must be attacked.
Sustainable development, democracy, and institutional arrangements for
the protection of basic rights will help ultimately solve conflict. A
balance of power may temporarily diminish it, but by leaving root causes
intact, makes future recurrences inevitable. U.S. foreign and national
security policy must thus promote fundamental rights and the peaceful
resolution of conflict. Our relations with a state should be determined
by the extent it supports these goals. Unlike realists, idealists reject
the notion that cultivating friendly dictators is sometimes a necessary
evil. Domestic arrangements, they believe, determine external behavior.
This means that a dictatorship can seldom be a peaceful neighbor, and
thus undercutting dictators contributes to regional stability.
In his classic study Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign
16
Relations, Robert Osgood attempted to reconcile idealism and realism.
For future American strategy in the Third World, the two approaches
remain compatible. They share, for example, the belief that Third World
conflict is contagious and can spread if not contained (the realist
option) or resolved (as idealists prefer). Both usually accept a
leadership role for the United States. Even though realists and
idealists admit that the United States must work in conjunction with
friends and allies, they believe it can, in President Clinton's words,
"serve as a fulcrum for change and a pivot point for peace."17 And,
perhaps most important, traditional realism and idealism have both been
state-centric, dealing primarily with regimes and seeing security as an
international issue. They both, in other words, reflect the past nature
of global politics rather than its future.
Despite the wide conceptual gap between idealism and realism,
American strategy has always blended them. Most idealist appeals such as
Truman's promise "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted
subjugation" were, according to Jonathan Clarke, "preceded by a
clear-headed analysis of American geopolitical self-interest."18 In
part, this intermingling of opposites was necessary because of the
diverse audiences American national security policy must satisfy.
Idealism, with its strong moral emphasis, is inherently more appealing
to the mass public. Americans want to feel that our policy places us on
the side of "good." Foreign policy elites tend more toward realism with
its pursuit of interests stripped of moral overtones. The United States
is most effective when, as in the Gulf War, our actions combine a clear
moral component with rigorous promotion of geostrategic interests.
Unfortunately, such issues are scarce.
Over time, the specific blend of idealism and realism in American
strategy shifted to reflect world events, domestic politics, and the
proclivities of top policymakers. Kennedy, Carter, and Reagan moved
toward the idealist end of the spectrum, making freedom or human rights
central to their strategies for the Third World. Nixon understood the
world through a realist geopolitical lens (but used idealist language to
sell detente) and Bush, despite rhetoric about a "new world order,"
5
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leaned toward realism and a reliance on force.
Always, though, it was
a matter of blend and balance, shifting between fairly firm boundaries
defining the acceptable limits of realism and idealism in American
policy, and building a new consensus as the global security environment
changed.

Today, the old consensus defining the limits of realism and
idealism has eroded and the debate rages over the philosophical
foundation of future American national security strategy. Realism has
many articulate advocates among foreign policy analysts and strategic
thinkers. It is well represented in influential journals such as Foreign
Affairs, Foreign Policy, Orbis, and The Washington Quarterly, and
dominates others such as The National Interest and Global Affairs.20
"Neorealism" retains the general assumptions and beliefs of classical
cold war realism, but uses economics and, to a lesser extent, historical
security relations rather than ideology to prioritize American
interests.21 By contrast, post-cold war idealists argue "the United
States should take the lead in promoting the trend toward democracy."22
Key advocates include Joshua Muravchik and Morton Halperin--a former
Clinton nominee for a Defense Department post.23 Some of the most
interesting idealist initiatives come from the bipartisan, semi-official
National Endowment for Democracy.24 This organization represents the
institutionalization of idealism in an attempt to counterbalance the
realist proclivities of the foreign policy elite.
The Clinton administration leans toward idealism. In an important
September 1993 speech, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake stated,
"the idea of freedom has universal appeal" and saw "a moment of immense
democratic and entrepreneurial opportunity."25 With classic idealist
logic, he suggested, "to the extent democracy and market economics hold
sway in other nations, our own nation will be more secure, prosperous
and influential, while the broader world will be more humane and
peaceful."26 According to Lake, the successor to containment as
America's grand strategy must be "a strategy of enlargement--enlargement
of the world's free community of market democracies." But, as always,
the administration's idealism was tempered by realism. Lake noted that
the United States "must combine our broad goals of fostering democracy
and markets with our more traditional geostrategic interests." In
November 1993 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Secretary of State Warren Christopher appeared even further removed from
idealism when, in key Senate testimony, he stressed traditional
geostrategic concerns.27 The administration has also resisted calls to
end China's most favored nation trading status as punishment for human
rights abuses.28
The third dimension of debate over the future of U.S. national
security strategy concerns the form of our engagement in the world.
Unilateralists believe "if you want a job done right, you must do it
yourself." To effectively shape the sort of world the United States
seeks, they argue, we must act alone. Allies, driven by a different set
of national interests, are often more a burden than a help. American
foreign and national security policy has long been unilateralist in
regions such as the Caribbean and Central America, and multilateralist
in regions such as Europe where allies were necessary.
After the cold war, support for multilateralism surged. According
to President Bush, "Where in the past many times the heaviest burdens of
6

leadership fell to our nation, we will now see more efforts made to seek
consensus and concerted action."29 This did not connote equality between
allies, but a relationship where the United States is the senior partner
or chairman. In effect, this was an attempt to use our role in NATO as a
global model: there would be consultation, but final authority was to
remain in Washington. The ultimate goal was what Patrick E. Tyler
labeled "benevolent domination."30
Movement toward multilateralism seemed to accelerate during the
first six months of the Clinton administration, with the United Nations
the center of attention. Advocates of multilateralism, both in the
administration and outside it, believed that as the cold war stalemate
in the Security Council abated, the U.N. could finally play the active
role in conflict resolution envisioned by its founders. Some writers
even advocated U.N. conservatorship of "failed states" like Afghanistan
or Somalia.31 Multilateralists were particularly heartened by changing
notions of national sovereignty. "We are groping toward arrangements,"
according to Thomas G. Weiss, "by which egregious aggression,
life-threatening suffering, and human rights abuses become legitimate
international concerns more routinely."32 In fact, the decades-long
decline in the rigid notion of national sovereignty that holds that
affairs within a state's boundaries are only its concern--a decline
sparked by the Holocaust, decolonization, and global opposition to
racism and apartheid--is accelerating.33 Such changes in international
attitudes could pave the way for humanitarian intervention.34 Supporters
consider this both morally appealing--a resurgence and repackaging of
the 19th century notion of the white man's "civilizing mission" in the
Third World--and a practical way to augment American security. Andrew S.
Natsios, for instance, argues "Humanitarian intervention applied
carefully and with restraint is as much in the self-interest of the
United States as geopolitical intervention."35
President Clinton and his top advisors initially placed great
stress on strengthening the United Nations. During the 1992 election,
Clinton called for a U.N. "rapid deployment force...standing guard at
the borders of countries threatened by aggression, preventing mass
violence against civilian populations, providing relief and combatting
terrorism."36 Madeleine Albright, Clinton's representative to the United
Nations, talked of "assertive multilateralism" forming a cornerstone of
U.S. policy.37 Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff hailed
multilateralism as a way to maintain influence during defense cuts.38
The administration was especially enthusiastic about more assertive
forms of U.N. peacekeeping known as "second generation peace
operations."39 This reflected a sea change in official American
attitudes toward the U.N. from the skepticism of the Reagan era. Again,
this change began during the Bush presidency when he committed the
United States to take multinational peacekeeping more seriously during a
speech to the General Assembly.40
By the end of 1993, however, the enthusiasm of the Clinton
administration, Congress, and the American public for expanded U.N.
peacekeeping had waned.41 More and more, policymakers recognized that
rather than stretching scarce defense resources and sharing the burdens
of global security, U.N. peace operations could draw us into conflicts
we might otherwise have avoided.42 As a result, an administration policy
paper on peace operations underwent several revisions with increasingly
stringent conditions for U.S. involvement.43 And, Clinton was equally
7

unhappy with the inability of the European nations to stop the war in
Bosnia. We wanted the Europeans, as Grant Hammond points out, to do in
Bosnia what we refused to do in Haiti.44 This failure, Clinton believed,
challenged the idea that we could play the role of "one among equals" in
the resolution of regional conflicts. Although still multilateralist,
the Clinton administration entered 1994 much less sanguine about
strengthening the United Nations or relying on other forms of
cooperation. As with other dimensions of the debate over the American
approach to the world, no consensus had yet emerged to give direction to
national security policy. Debate still raged in all three dimensions.
The Changing Face of Security.
While the most dramatic changes in the global security environment
during the past 5 years took place in Europe, trends in the Third World
were equally profound. At first glance, these seem positive. With the
Soviet Union and its proxies no longer instigating and arming internal
war, Third World conflicts from El Salvador to Mozambique moved toward
resolution. Regions like the southern cone of South America that seemed
on the verge of war 10 years ago were now dominated by economic
integration and cooperation.45 The overall economic stagnation and debt
crises which dominated much of the Third World in the 1980s slackened
somewhat in the face of market-oriented reform. This was most pronounced
in places like Chile and Mexico, but even Sub-Saharan African nations
which implemented strict reform packages suggested by the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund reaped economic benefits.46 Political trends
seem equally positive. In many parts of the Third World elected
governments replaced dictatorships, leading to talk of a "democratic
revolution." And the defeat of Iraq by a global coalition seemed to send
a warning to other Third World states bent on traditional cross-border
aggression. All of this could suggest a rosy future built on stability,
security, and progress.
In reality, the long-term prognosis for the Third World is not
promising. A confluence of political, economic, health, ecological,
social, and security patterns portend danger, perhaps even disaster.
American strategy must carefully assess these trends, project them into
the future, and plan accordingly. Such thinking is necessarily based on
informed speculation or "best guesses," but is the only way to avoid a
reactive, short-sighted strategy.
Politically, the democratic revolution in the Third World has
largely run its course. There are few remaining candidates for
transformation from authoritarianism to democracy and many reasons to
expect a reversal of the democratic revolution.47 In fact, backsliding-reversion to some form of authoritarianism--is likely as new democracies
face a plethora of economic, ecological, and social challenges. In
country after country, it is becoming clear that simply holding
elections does not build and consolidate a democratic culture.48
Beleaguered elected leaders, pressed by rising demands, disintegrating
security, and stagnant economies, are likely to temporarily or
permanently abolish legislatures and postpone elections as in Peru. In
some regions, old-fashioned military coups will occur. Others will mimic
Italy of the 1920s, Germany of the 1930s, or Argentina of the 1940s as
charismatic extremists play on widespread frustrations to turn
popularity into political power.
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This reversal of the democratic revolution will be the first step
in a long-term slide into ungovernability as traditional nation-states
prove unable to meet either the tangible or spiritual needs of their
subjects.49 "The nation-state," according to Kenichi Ohmae, "has become
an unnatural, even dysfunctional, unit for organizing human activity and
managing economic endeavor in a borderless world."50 President Clinton
even noted its growing obsolescence with simultaneous trends toward
supranational economic integration and subnational political
fragmentation.51 In its extreme form, ungovernability generates "failed
states" characterized by declining or destroyed public order, rising
domestic violence, stagnating economies, and deteriorating
infrastructure.52 Afghanistan is, perhaps, typical. There, according to
Tim Weiner, "There is no civil law, no government, no economy--only guns
and drugs and anger."53 Even states with a recent history of stability
such as Algeria are tottering toward disintegration.54 In addition to
Afghanistan, the current list of failed states includes Bosnia, Liberia,
Mozambique, and Somalia. Potentially, the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa and
the periphery of the former Soviet Union will follow.55 Short of
outright chaos, many other Third World states will see ungovernability
ebb and flow, with parts of their territory permanently beyond
government control.
All of the traditional sources of national cohesion--a common
culture and language, organization of a coherent national economy,
administrative effectiveness, and the ability to provide security--are
under challenge. As a result, according to Robert D. Kaplan, "the
classificatory grid of nation-states is going to be replaced by a
jagged-glass pattern of city-states, shanty-states, nebulous and
anarchic regionalisms..."56 A common model may be medieval Europe,
pre-Tokugawa Japan, or modern Lebanon where central governments control
a few regions and, perhaps, the capital, but most day-to-day power is
diffused. In the future Third World, weak central governments will
coexist with the personal fiefdoms of charismatic leaders or warlords,
or with autonomous regions defined by ethnicity, tribalism, race, or
religion. Each of these small units will probably have its own security
force. And like medieval Europe, the Third World will also see the rise
of a number of independent "micro-states," often autonomous cities with
no ties to a larger political unit or with allegiance to a loose
grouping such as the Hanseatic League.
Economic trends are almost as dire. A handful of states in Asia
and Latin America have experienced dramatic economic growth spurred
primarily by export of manufactured products. For most Third World
nations, however, rapidly growing populations, shortages of capital and
human resources, inadequate and often decaying infrastructure,
instability, corruption, and misguided government policies will prevent
sustained economic development. Producers of primary products, whether
agricultural or mineral, have undergone decades of relative economic
decline in comparison to manufacturing or service economies. There is no
reason to expect this to change. As the developed world continues the
shift from manufacturing to information-based economies, there will be
opportunities for Third World states to serve as manufacturing centers,
but only a few will be able to take advantage of this.
Third World states are also increasingly incapable of assuring the
basic health needs of their citizens. In many parts of the Third World,
AIDS will contribute to ungovernability by delegitimizing the government
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and by killing many of the educated leaders and administrators.57 The
same is true of Third World governments' inability to manage their
ecologies. In fact, one of the most ominous trends throughout the Third
World is serious degradation of the environment. From a combination of
population pressure, destructive methods of economic development, rapid
urbanization, and decaying infrastructure, most Third World nations
suffer dire and worsening ecological problems. They range from
deforestation leading to soil erosion, climate change, water pollution,
and famine to more "modern" forms of decay such as severe air or noise
pollution. All contribute to ungovernability and prevent sustained
economic development. While attention to ecological issues is increasing
among Third World elites, many still see environmentalism and economic
growth as alternative choices rather than complementary objectives.
"They have no realization of their own vulnerability," according to
Crispin Tickell, "and want only to imitate the industrial world."58
Because ecological decay can cause conflict, an increasing trend
is to redefine the concept of national security to include environmental
issues.59 According to Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, the principal social
effects of environmental degradation are decreased agricultural
production, economic decline, population displacement, and disrupted
institutions and social relations.60 From these, three types of
conflicts can emerge: simple scarcity conflicts as people compete for
river water, fish, and productive land; group identity conflicts arising
when people of one group migrate away from their traditional homelands
and are seen as a threat by groups in the areas they move to; and,
relative deprivation conflicts when ecological decay heightens
poverty.61 Ecological decay can also lead to interstate conflict,
particularly over control of shared fresh water sources such as the
Euphrates, Jordan and La Plata rivers.62
One of the most important social trends in the Third World is the
search for frameworks of personal meaning, order, and value to replace
those destroyed by modernization. Modernization brought mass movement
from rural areas and villages where daily life was structured by
traditional frameworks of meaning, order, and value to cities where
traditional frameworks were weak or inapplicable. Building alternative
frameworks has been a crucial and often unsolved challenge for Third
World leaders. Usually, they approached this in one of three ways. One
was to import Western social, political, and economic models. This was
especially prevalent in former colonies. A second approach was to adopt
an alternative ideology, often Marxism-Leninism or one of its variants.
This offered a substitute for traditional systems of order and meaning
which seemed, to Third World radicals, more attractive than Western
democracy and capitalism. The third approach synthesized the old and the
new, took some elements of Westernism, sometimes added a smattering of
socialism, and blended them with components of the traditional
framework. Such a synthesis occurred throughout Sub- Saharan Africa, in
some Islamic countries such as Turkey, and in Asian states like Japan
and Korea. It was often paired with a program of supranational identity
such as Pan-Africanism, Pan-Arabism, or the Non-Aligned Movement.
The Iranian revolution showed that none of these approaches was
fully satisfactory. Islamic extremism there, according to Robert Kaplan,
was "the psychological defense mechanism of many urbanized peasants
threatened with the loss of traditions in pseudo-modern cities where
their values [were] under attack."63 Around the globe, modernizing Third
10

World elites had been too quick to jettison traditional systems of
personal meaning whether religious, ethnic, or tribal. They
underestimated the power and persistence of tradition. By the 1990s, the
attempt to find personal meaning, values, and order in traditional
frameworks had spread throughout the Third World. This appeared in two
interlinked forms. The first was religious fundamentalism, whether
Islamic, Hindu, or some other. The second was what can be called
"primalism" where politics is defined by subnational identities such as
ethnicity or tribalism.
While primalism has long shaped the politics of Sub-Saharan
Africa, South Asia, and parts of the Middle East, by the 1980s it proved
very much alive in Eastern Europe, on the periphery of the former Soviet
Union, and even in the parts of Latin America with substantial
Amerindian populations (Peru, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Mexico). Former
colonies, in particular, are susceptible to fragmentation from
primalism. To more easily rule their colonies, the European powers
deliberately emphasized primal identities in order to divide and
conquer. For a while, the decolonization struggle and, to a lesser
extent, the cold war, helped preserve the fragile unity of heterogenous
Third World nations. Perhaps the starkest modern example of primal
conflict arising from a form of decolonization is in South Africa. To
help preserve apartheid, the white government there encouraged tribal
and ethnic division. Today, of course, this not only shapes the
political competition, but has also spawned conflict bordering on war.
Today, states without the sort of religious unity that exists in
North Africa and the Middle East or, to a lesser degree in Latin
America, have seen politics splinter along primal lines rather than
political ones. Robert Kaplan argues that as nation-states disintegrate,
religion can provide an alternative framework of order.64 But, as
Lebanon, Afghanistan, Iraq, and some of the Central Asian states of the
former Soviet Union show, Islam does not prevent primal conflict. In
fact, many states of the Middle East and North Africa are seeing a
resurgence of primalism. Algeria, where minority Berber tribesmen are
forming self-defense forces, is an example.65 Even Turkey remains unable
to quash a persistent Kurdish uprising in its mountainous southeast.66
August Richard Norton has argued that one of the major problems
for Third World nations in the 1990s will be their difficulty meeting
the "psychopolitical" and cultural needs of their citizens.
Fundamentalism and primalism both illustrate the fragility and
artificiality of Third World states. Both show the failure of a
decades-long attempt to create a framework of meaning based on national
identity. There is no reason to believe that the search for alternatives
through fundamentalism and primalism will not intensify, further erode
the legitimacy of national regimes, contribute to political
fragmentation, and, in many cases, lead to ungovernability.
What, then, do these trends mean for Third World security? Three
types of security challenges will dominate the Third World during the
coming decades:
• low-level conflict ranging from widespread crime to a form of
semipolitical organized crime called "gray area phenomenon";
• internal war against or between primal militias and
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fundamentalist insurgencies, or violence against groups forced to
migrate by ecological decay and economic stagnation; and,
• interstate war instigated by what Anthony Lake calls "backlash
states" with large conventional militaries and, increasingly, weapons of
mass destruction.67
Often a single conflict will mix two or even three of these challenges.
A monopoly of organized coercive powers was one of the factors
that historically contributed to the rise and consolidation of the
nation-state. Central governments became strong in England, France and
elsewhere because they could militarily defeat internal challengers. The
state then attained legitimacy because it could protect people most of
the time. In today's Third World, that is becoming increasingly rare. A
range of groups from criminal cartels to ethnic militias can resist the
state's military. This is not simply a doomsday scenario for the distant
future, but today's reality. In much of the Third World, governments
cannot provide basic, day-to-day security. Walls topped by concertina
wire and backed by elaborate alarm systems are standard on even
middle-class homes. In poorer neighborhoods, even dirt-floored,
single-room houses have thick bars on the windows. More and more
businesses have their own armed guards. Of course, this also describes
conditions in parts of many American cities, but in the Third World it
is the norm rather than an aberration. Defense and security are becoming
essentially local concepts rather than international ones.68 Police are
overwhelmed, and even militaries are unable to provide basic community
security.
The implications are profound. As Martin van Crevald contends:
The most important single demand that any political
community must meet is the demand for protection. A
community which cannot safeguard the lives of its
members, subjects, citizens, comrades, brothers, or
whatever they are called is unlikely either to command
their loyalty or to survive for very long.69
As states prove unable to offer basic daily protection to their
citizens, those citizens will increasingly see the state as irrelevant
and shift loyalties to some sort of subnational defense organization
that can provide basic protection. For a while, most Third World
nation-states will retain conventional militaries to diligently watch
for foreign invaders that never come. Eventually, these armies will
decay and disband.
What Peter Lupsha calls "gray area phenomena" also provide a
difficult challenge for conventionally-configured security forces.70
These are threats to security that fall somewhere between traditional,
politico-military challenges and large-scale organized crime. They
include traditional revolutionary insurgencies that use organized crime
to fund their cause as well as traditional criminal organizations with
large, well-equipped armed forces.71 Most modern Third World military
forces are not intellectually or doctrinally equipped to deal with gray
area challenges and the associated corruption. Police forces face
similar problems from corruption and, in addition, are often outgunned.
From a historical perspective, gray area threats are not an entirely new
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security problem. Throughout history, bandits and pirates have posed
threats and, if unchecked by military forces, eroded the legitimacy of
governments. What is happening today is a return to this tradition as
military history proves cyclical rather than linear.
Primalism, although originating in political struggle,
increasingly sparks security problems. This is not entirely new: primal
violence existed throughout the cold war. There were unadulterated
primal conflicts in Sri Lanka, Philippines, Burma, India, Zimbabwe,
Algeria, Iraq, and Nigeria. At the same time, many ideological conflicts
had powerful primal dimensions. Examples include insurgencies in Oman,
Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Guatemala, and Peru. The end of the
cold war simply accelerated the process of turning primal differences
into armed conflict. In part, this is due to the weakening of the
coercive and control mechanisms of Third World states. Neither Russia
nor the United States is interested in supporting expensive clients
attempting to hold together unviable states. Moscow and Washington are
only marginally more interested in the expensive process of cleaning up
the residue of their conflict among former friends no longer interested
in superpower guidance. In the "end-of-century world," as John Keegan
observed, "the rich states that imposed remilitarization from above have
made peace their watchword and the poor states that suffered
remilitarization from below spurn or traduce the gift..."72 At a more
practical level, the end of the cold war also left the Third World awash
in arms, allowing many ethnic, religious, or tribal organizations to
field militias or insurgencies. The incentives for primal war have long
obtained; now the external constraints are removed and the physical
means to pursue such a course are available.
Other factors unrelated to the cold war ease the transformation of
political primalism into violence. For example, the distribution of
wealth and power in many Third World nations reflects clan, family,
ethnic, tribal, or religious lines. This makes primal conflict more than
simply a cultural struggle, but a winner-take-all competition for
fundamental power and group survival. Primal conflict often has
international dimensions as states support primal violence to weaken or
punish neighbors. This has long occurred in the Kurdish regions of Iran
and Iraq, Kashmir, Ethiopia, Angola, and elsewhere. Sub-Saharan African
states, in particular, are likely to support insurgents from neighboring
nations or, at least, to make minimal efforts to control them.73 Today
the same thing is occurring in the periphery of the former Soviet bloc.
During the cold war, most nations at least officially opposed
secessionism. As primalism becomes more important in defining the
security environment of most regions, the opprobrium surrounding
secessionism has declined, thus creating the potential for the
internationalization of ethnic conflict.74
Often primalism and crime combine to stoke anarchy or
ungovernability. In many ways, South Africa may be an unfortunate model
of the future. That nation is torn by primal violence often pitting
Zulus against Xhosas, but also Zulus against Zulus in a struggle between
the African National Congress and Inkatha Freedom Party, and, of course,
whites against blacks. More than 10,000 South Africans have died in
primal violence since 1985. At the local level, the result is
gangsterism and anarchy. Examining eastern South Africa, Bill Berkeley
writes,
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Natal's warlords have been compared to fourteenth-century
Italian signori and twentieth-century Chinese and
Lebanese warlords, Colombian drug lords, and Mafia
racketeers. Like all of these, Natal's warlords control
fiefdoms through a mixture of terror and patronage. In
their own fiefs they can tax and recruit, run protection
rackets, hire hit men, and finance private militias by
extorting tribute from their subjects.75
In areas where private warlords do not control security, other
non-state organizations do. Both the African National Congress and
Inkatha Freedom Party have established military training camps in
Natal.76 "Anarchy," according to Berkeley, "is compelling many people to
seek allegiance with political parties for refuge, vengeance, or
both...Political parties have become justice organizations for millions
of people because there is a big vacuum that the police are either
unable or unwilling to fill."77
The third security problem faced by Third World nations is
traditional inter-state aggression. Particularly dangerous are the
handful of decaying backlash states with major conventional armed forces
which either have or will acquire weapons of mass destruction.
Obviously, the danger from proliferation varies according to the
possessor.78 States without territorial ambitions pose less danger than
unstable personalistic dictatorships such as Qaddafi's Libya, Hussein's
Iraq, or Kim's North Korea with regional or territorial ambitions. As
such regimes recognize that they cannot sustain their conventional
forces without Soviet patronage and conclude from the Gulf War that such
forces offer little security against the advanced nations anyway, they
actively seek weapons of mass destruction. Despite U.S. efforts, they
will eventually obtain them.79 Coupled with the proliferation of
delivery systems such as ballistic missiles, these backlash states,
which are externally aggressive in large part because of their internal
insecurity, will threaten their neighbors.80 Eventually they too will
fragment or sink into ungovernability; this process will pose extreme
dangers.
The face of Third World security is also changing at a systemic
level. On one hand, the Third World is enlarging as parts of the former
Soviet bloc join. At the same time, the Third World is splitting into
two distinct parts. The future international system, then, will be
divided into three tiers.81 The defining feature will be governability.
The first tier consists of governable states, most in North America,
Western Europe, or the Asia Pacific region. While some of them may have
small internal pockets of un- or semigovernability, they will generally
be stable. This tier will be dominated by information-driven economic
and cultural integration--these states will represent what the Tofflers
call the "third wave."82 Because of a whole range of political,
economic, and social developments, there is little chance of sustained
major war among the states of the first tier.83 Their primary security
concern will be keeping instability from the Third World away from their
borders at a manageable cost.
The second tier will include "cusp" states which fluctuate between
governability and crisis, or which have distinct and persistent internal
pockets of ungovernability. Some of these will be states physically
located on the boundaries of the traditional Third World such as Mexico,
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Israel, and Turkey. Some will be large states such as China, India,
Brazil, and Russia combining advanced and backward regions. This
unevenness will even extend to the cities and megalopolises of these
countries where sections of stability and lively economic activity will
coexist with ungovernable slums. As in Mexico's recent "Zapatista"
uprising, most security problems for these nations will arise from the
tension between backward and advanced regions. In some cases, the two
will politically split. Second tier economies will continue to mix
information-intensive advanced sectors with traditional industry and, in
the backward regions, profound underdevelopment. The second tier will
also include states "special" for some reason of geography, especially
possession of petroleum. Eventually, though, petroleum will lose its
central role in the world economy, and petroleum producers will be
divided into those with small populations which can retain governability
by living off of investments made during the boom years, and larger ones
susceptible to ungovernability.
Occasionally, a well-governed second tier state will make the
transition to the first tier using information-based economics. After
all, one defining feature of modern age is diffusion of information. A
networked personal computer is the key to economic activity, and there
is no reason to believe that the developed nations of Europe, Northeast
Asia, and North America will retain a permanent monopoly on vital
information and information technology. Relatively small second tier
states will find this transition easier. In fact, some cities may secede
from the poorer parts of their nations to emulate the success of Hong
Kong or Singapore. As they try to move into the first tier, a key
problem for second tier states will be keeping talent at home. Success
will come to those that rely on incentives. States that attempt
disincentives, whether legal or appeals to nationalism, will often fail.
The third tier of the world system will consist of the
ungovernables. Most will have small pockets of stability where the rich
cluster and are defended by private security forces or where some sort
of local authoritarianism preserves order through the use of militias,
but fragmentation and instability will be the norm. Occasionally,
authoritarian regimes able to impose some degree of stability throughout
a country will arise, but most of these will be short-lived. Regions
with an organic substitute system of order such as Islam will tend to be
more stable than regions where primalism forms the only alternative to
nationalism.84 Because of pervasive poverty, ecological decay will be
particularly dire in the third tier. A few national governments will
forestall fragmentation for a while, but in most third tier states,
power and authority will disperse, with primal or personalistic militias
ranging from sophisticated miniatures of conventional combined-arms
forces to untrained bands of thugs forming the dominant type of military
organization.
A Strategy for the Future.
What, then, should a U.S. strategy for the Third World which
reflects currents trends look like? For starters, a strategy for the
future must retain elements of both idealism and realism. In the "CNN
era," idealism is necessary to sustain domestic support. Because
realism, with its cold amorality, has little appeal to the mass public
it often takes idealism--a sense of promoting good--to mobilize public
support for overseas engagement. According to Morton H. Halperin, "if
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Americans saw that U.S. policymakers were promoting democracy around the
globe, they would be more likely to support American policy with
financial commitments and military action when necessary to accomplish
those foreign policy goals."85 Thus any future strategy which does not
make the United States a force for good will be unsustainable. And this
is not simply a matter of public relations or image manipulation: there
is a definite moral imperative in U.S. foreign and national security
strategy. We are a nation defined by shared unifying political and
economic values such as representative democracy, due process of law,
and free enterprise rather than ethnicity, race, religion, history, or
even language. Because we are multicultural, these political and
economic values must be considered universal. If our values are not
appropriate for the Third World, their applicability to Asian-Americans,
African-Americans, or any of our other subcultures can be questioned. We
thus paint a seamless relationship between the values by which we
organize our own society and the values that shape our foreign and
national security policy.
The idealistic component of our future strategy must, however, be
modest in expectations. As Third World nations become ungovernable and
democratic regimes prove unable to cope with ecological decay,
population growth, economic stagnation, and new security challenges,
many will turn to authoritarianism and charisma-based extremism. Given
this, the major idealistic component of a future American strategy
should support cheap, low-casualty, multilateral humanitarian relief,
and opposition to genocide rather than promotion of democracy. American
intervention in Somalia, despite confused objectives and a poor job of
mobilizing public support, is something of a model for the future. In
terms of its humanitarian goals, the operation was a success. Famine was
averted. In the future, we will be called on to do this again.
Hopefully, in those instances we can save lives without any illusions of
rebuilding societies. Of course this leaves us open to the charge that
humanitarian relief without social and political reconstruction is a
stop-gap action that must often be repeated when fragile peace
collapses. This is true, but unavoidable: the imposed reconstruction of
failed states in the third tier is not worth the costs and risks.
Prevention of genocide may be the exception. This must, however, be
multilateral. As morally painful as it is, the United States must resist
the urge to intervene unilaterally to stop primal conflict when a
multilateral coalition cannot be formed.
The future strategy should promote human rights in nondemocracies,
again with modest expectations. Traditional idealism considered human
rights and democracy inextricable. It is true that democracies are
usually the best and most consistent protectors of human rights. But
given the tendencies toward ungovernability and even anarchy in the
Third World, authoritarianism will be common. In many regions, the best
we can hope for will be more-or-less benevolent dictators. Economic
power applied collectively should be our major tool. We must continue to
treat backsliders such as Peru's Fujimori who act undemocratically with
popular support different than unabashedly corrupt and repressive
regimes like the ruling cabal in Haiti. Phrased differently, protection
of human rights rather than techniques for selecting political elites
must be the benchmark used to determine a regime's relationship with the
United States.
The strategy of the future also needs a healthy dose of realism.
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We must protect existing tangible interests in the Third World even as
we seek to diminish them. Currently, no other natural resource generates
nearly the same degree of strategic risk and dependency as petroleum so
nothing could more unencumber our national security strategy than
lessening our overall dependence on petroleum. Development of
alternative fuels, then, is a national security priority. Potentially,
fresh water may become equally significant. If so, our strategy must be
adapted to accommodate this. The possibility of military intervention to
protect access to any other nonpetroleum strategic resource is small,
but we must intelligently manage the strategic stockpile, encourage
domestic mining, and assure multiple source of key minerals.86
The primary tangible interest driving U.S. strategy in the future
should be ecological sanity. This should be a centerpiece, a determining
criterion of the extent and form of our engagement in a Third World
country. The interface of ecological issues and security is of paramount
importance, but because it is at the cutting edge of strategy, there are
no precedents or historical lessons. As a result, the raw materials of
strategy--imperatives, principles, techniques, and procedures--must be
invented. Even though there is no clear consensus either within the
United States or in the world community on the appropriate response to
ecological security issues, it is possible to make several contentions
about future strategy. For example, the ecological dimension of our
security strategy demands close cooperation among the U.S. military,
other government agencies, other nations, and nongovernmental groups.
Actions to support ecological security will range from preemptive,
conflict-avoiding peacetime engagement to outright intervention.
Preemptive actions in cooperation with host governments are relatively
easy. Intervention is not. In the future, there will be cases where
ecological insanity poses a direct threat to neighboring states, thus
aiding the formation of support for intervention both within the United
States and among other nations. More difficult are cases of indirect
security problems arising from ecological mismanagement (e.g.
migration), strictly internal problems, and, most amorphous of all,
incipient ecological insanity. Existing global norms simply do not
account for these. The United States should lead the campaign to
construct such norms. On a more immediate level, the United States must
develop techniques for low-tech responses to ecological problems that
can be sustained by host nations with only moderate U.S. assistance.
Priorities should be fuels to replace firewood and charcoal,
economically viable reforestation programs, and methods for cleaning
water supplies poisoned from sewage and industrial pollution. As we
frame policy, ecological assistance should be considered in the same
terms as any other component of security and developmental assistance.
Ecological issues should not be the only form of realism in the
future American strategy toward the Third World. We should be concerned
with regional balances, but if we are able to diminish our dependence on
imported petroleum, few if any of these will warrant U.S. military
intervention. Instead we should serve, to use Alberto Coll's phrase, as
the "grand facilitator" providing good offices and using economic and
political power to preserve balances.87 We should avoid the tendency to
overmanage regional balances. For backlash states such as Iraq, Libya,
and North Korea, we should always consider political, economic, and
perhaps even military support of dissidents, preferably in conjunction
with regional allies. This is admittedly very risky and runs the
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possibility of creating new failed states, more Bosnias and Somalias, or
of provoking a dying dictatorship to lash out at its neighbors or launch
a terrorist campaign against the United States.
Proliferation will complicate and flavor all such decisions. As
Michèle A. Flournoy argues, "nuclear proliferation will compel the
United States to distinguish anew those interests worth the risk of
nuclear confrontation from those that are not."88 We must learn to live
with this. Our traditional nonproliferation strategy is bankrupt. As a
replacement, we must mobilize American and global public support for a
new form of deterrence that explicitly states that any use of weapons of
mass destruction is a crime against humanity to be punished by
overwhelming military force (albeit conventional, stand-off weaponry).89
This will have definite limits. There is at least the possibility that
small groups or even individuals bent on punishing their enemies at any
cost may acquire weapons of mass destruction.90 These will not be
deterrable.91 In most cases, though, states will retain a monopoly over
the capability to effectively deliver weapons of mass destruction, and
these can be deterred. There is also the possibility that a conventional
war involving one or more nuclear-armed states might require
multilateral intervention before it reaches the point of desperation.
Even preemption might be necessary in the case of nuclear-armed "crazy
states."92
In the future, the United States must be less engaged in the Third
World, especially in ungovernable third tier regions. The problems there
are simply beyond our ability to cure at a reasonable cost. As advocated
by many 19th century American statesmen, we should serve as a model,
offer advice when asked, but resist the interventionist urge. And the
danger from extensive involvement in Third World conflict goes beyond
simple frustration and expense. It can challenge, even erode our core
values. If engaged in primal conflict, the United States would have two
options. One would be to retain our own standards and refuse to adopt
the repulsive features of primal conflict such as the killing of
civilians. As in Vietnam, this would mean accepting a strategic loss to
preserve core national values. The second option would be to "fight fire
with fire," to answer those who murder civilians, establish
concentration camps, starve enemy populations, and mortar marketplaces
with equal force. In World War II where vital interests if not outright
national survival were at stake, this was necessary. In the future Third
World, it will never be. The long-term cost of fighting fire with fire
in a peripheral conflict is, as France discovered in Algeria, erosion of
national values and severe internal political conflict.93
Primal conflict spawns an endless series of deadly traps for the
United States. Because the enemy in such struggles is a people rather
than a regime or states, nothing they can do, no change of policy or
position, can diminish the threat they pose to their enemies. This makes
the distinction between combatants and noncombatants meaningless. Yet
this very feature of primal conflict creates an image of evil likely to
provoke indignation, repulsion, and a desire for intervention among
Americans. The evil inherent in primal war makes us want to intervene,
but will debilitate us if we do. "Such conflicts," John Keegan writes,
"by their nature defy efforts at mediation from outside, since they are
fed by passions and rancours that do not yield to rational measure or
persuasion or control..."94 The best American response is thus moral
anguish coupled with rejection of the urge to intervene.
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Even if the United States does not explicitly choose extensive
disengagement from the Third World, it may be forced upon us. There is
likely to be a resurgence of anti-Americanism as Third World regimes
recognize their declining strategic significance in the post-cold war
world. In a game played throughout the Third World, leaders created
artificial importance by flirting with one superpower or the other or by
giving the impression of imminent danger from the clients of the other
superpower. Nations strategically insignificant by most measures thus
became important actors on the global stage. Backwater conflicts in
Angola, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Vietnam became front-page news.
After the cold war, historical normalcy will return as small,
out-of-the-way nations again become unimportant. A few groups may
attempt to use terrorism to gain attention as the Palestinians did.
During the late cold war period, Third World anti-Americanism became an
important variable in our foreign policy.95 In a replay of this, the
most common reaction to the frustration of insignificance in the
post-cold war period will be even more virulent anti-Americanism.
There will be exceptions. Some second tier states attempting the
move to first tier status will remain cordial to protect access to
American markets, technology, and capital. In the short term, Third
World nations who fear conventional aggression from their neighbors such
as the Arab Persian Gulf states will also be friendly toward the United
States. But without Soviet assistance, backlash states not wealthy
enough to equip themselves in the international arms market will
eventually lose the ability to attack across borders and will sink into
ungovernability. This tendency will accelerate if arms producers,
especially China, stop supplying military equipment to unstable Third
World friends. Encouraging this should be a strategic priority. If the
first tier can unite in opposition to large-scale weapons exports, new
suppliers will arise, but their products will remain second quality,
thus posing no direct danger to first tier militaries.
Most Third World nations will face internal challenges from
traditional revolutionary insurgency, primal conflict, and gray area
phenomena.96 Since many will reject assistance from the United States,
there will probably be a group of second and even third tier states
experienced in conflict short of war willing to provide training and
assistance (for a price). Possible candidates include Israel, Taiwan,
Guatemala, El Salvador, and South Africa. Eventually, conflict short of
war will probably be privatized. Nonnational corporations will supply
training, advice, and equipment to beleaguered regimes. These may be
headquartered in first tier states where they have easy access to
information and technology. If such new mercenaries meet with moral and
political disapproval in the first tier, they will establish themselves
in Third World states willing to tolerate them for the money, security,
and technology they bring.
Even as the United States undergoes partial disengagement from
third tier regimes, it should at least establish basic ties with the
increasingly important sub- and non-state actors. This would require
some major changes in our attitudes toward statecraft. Traditionally, we
dealt primarily with the government in a foreign country. But as
ungovernability spreads, governments in third tier states will be only
one among many centers of power, and often not the most important one.
Real power will lie with primal militias, charismatic extremists,
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warlords, drug cartels, and corporations. As difficult and complex as it
may be, Americans must deal with the real sources of power in a nation,
not symbolic ones.
A future U.S. strategy for the Third World must continue to blend
unilateralism and multilateralism. There is some modest utility in
strengthening the United Nations, but its flaws and shortcomings are
much too serious to make it a primary element of a future American
strategy for the Third World. There is currently a struggle between the
two personalities of the U.N. It is simultaneously a conglomeration of
states and the representative of collective global consciousness
transcending the interests of individual states. In the future, the
struggle between the forces of global integration and disintegration
will probably shatter the U.N. As Alvin and Heidi Toffler write,
"International organizations unable to incorporate, co-opt, enfeeble, or
destroy new nonnational sources of power will crumble into
irrelevance."97 For the United States, there will be more long-term
value in a more homogenous political organization composed only of first
tier states. This may be an outgrowth of NATO, a split-off from the
U.N., or some entirely new organization.
In the mid-term, though, the U.N.'s major function should be to
serve as the facilitator for the resolution of conflict in third tier
regions where U.S. concerns are minimal. The notion of multilateral
efforts at humanitarian relief or even humanitarian intervention where
the United States provides intelligence, transportation, aerospace
power, and naval support has great merit. With successful reform, the
United Nations could direct these.98 At the same time, the United States
must rigorously avoid any changes to the U.N. system which erode the
power of the Security Council or limit our veto. NATO has some potential
for containing Third World conflict, but if the Bosnian conflict is an
indicator, it will not be able to perform this role and should focus on
security in Eastern Europe.
Future American strategy should attempt to improve techniques for
the collective application of nonmilitary power such as the political
and economic isolation of backlash states and regimes. This is
notoriously hard to do, and nearly all past economic sanctions have been
leaky. Such problems do not, however, mean that political and economic
isolation is worthless. Even the often-breached sanctions against South
Africa helped bring that conflict to the point of political resolution.
What the United States should do, then, is further hone this tool.
Military Implications.
Over the next 10 years, the chance of major American involvement
in sustained land warfare in the Third World will drop to near zero.
There are a number of reasons for this. One is the basic logic of
strategy. It pits two or more thinking, adapting antagonists in
conflict, each seeking the weakness or vulnerability of the other. In
strategy, success breeds obsolescence. The Gulf War demonstrated our
superiority at conventional land warfare, so no Third World tyrant with
an iota of sense will challenge us that way again. While Schwarzkopf's
disdain for Hussein's strategic talent was warranted, there are astute
military thinkers in the Third World. We simply cannot base our future
strategy on the assumption that our enemy will be stupid.
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In addition, the Persian Gulf was unusual in that the United
States had clear, tangible national interests which could be used to
mobilize domestic support for military intervention. Since tangible U.S.
interests in the nonpetroleum producing parts of the Third World are
small and declining, there would be tremendous resistance to American
involvement in most serious conflicts. It is important to remember the
weakness of initial congressional and public support for the armed
liberation of Kuwait. Outside the Middle East, Korea is considered the
most likely spot for conventional war. This may occur, but, if not,
public support for the continued defense of this increasingly wealthy
ally will erode.
Potential opponents in the Third World know that Saddam Hussein
was right when he concluded that the American public's low tolerance for
casualties was our greatest weakness. Most of them would do better than
Hussein at assuring that we suffer such casualties if we become involved
in their conflicts. Speculating on the possibility of U.S. involvement
in Afghanistan, Abdul Haq, a mujahedeen commander, said, "...if they
step in, they will be stuck. We have a British grave in Afghanistan. We
have a Soviet grave. And then we will have an American grave."99
Beyond simply fanaticism, technology augments the ability of
potential Third World enemies to cause American casualties. One aspect
of the ongoing revolution in military affairs is dispersion of
destructive power and--even more ominously--the ability to apply it. A
terrorist or, to use a more politically neutral term, commando correctly
armed and backed with solid intelligence can kill many Americans.
Improved force security can only partially ameliorate this. With
proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, the
political risks of conventional military operations will continue to
mount. We will very soon reach a point where none of our relatively
limited interests in the Third World justify the risks of conventional
military intervention. Furthermore, as nuclear weapons proliferate and
states fragment, the likelihood of conventional interstate war in the
Third World is itself declining.100 The few states remaining intact will
deter each other, and the multitude of organizations and groups which
replace states will make a different form of war.
Since our current military strategy focuses on Third World
contingencies, the declining chances of American involvement in land
warfare there have profound implications. As Daniel Bolger wrote,
"yesterday's solutions, no matter how dramatically executed, rarely
address tomorrow's problems."101 In the future, the most likely opponents
the United States will face in the Third World will not be low-grade,
Soviet-style conventional armies as in the Gulf War, but gray area
organizations, primal militias, the private armies of warlords or
corporations, and, for a while, unstable and aggressive nations armed
with both conventional military forces and weapons of mass destruction.
To meet these threats, the U.S. military must prepare for both offensive
and defensive missions.
There will be three primary types of offensive missions. One will
be humanitarian and ecological operations ranging from cooperative
relief to outright intervention. These will always be interagency and
multinational. For preemptive actions in cooperation with host nations,
involvement of the U.S. military will be limited and temporary. It would
include things such as the provision of transportation, intelligence,
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and basic infrastructure for use by ecological relief agencies. When
ecological insanity poses an international threat, when the host nation
is not cooperative, or when nations or subnational groups in
ungovernable regions use ecological damage as a deliberate tool of
conflict, the U.S. military would play a more important role. The same
holds when famine is used as a tool of war as in Sudan and Somalia. In
addition to security for civilian relief agencies, the U.S. military
would punish groups using deliberate ecological destruction or
humanitarian disaster. In both humanitarian and ecological operations,
the U.S. military must improve coordination with nonmilitary agencies
and organizations, and must develop better procedures for the
collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. It must also
develop more appropriate equipment and methods for operational planning,
force packaging, and training.
A second type of offensive mission will be strikes by small,
joint, but unilateral teams to punish enemies or enforce international
actions. These may be organized into patterns which constitute a new
form of campaign, but seldom will lead to sustained combat. Most often,
they will be stand-off strikes using precision conventional weapons.
When facing a nuclear-armed opponent, we will choose to avoid escalation
to conventional warfare. When the opponent is a militia or gray area
organization, the enemy will refuse to be drawn into conventional
combat. Outside of Europe, the only potential for traditional sustained
combat will come when the opponent is a conventionally-armed
nation-state which does not yet possess weapons of mass destruction, or
when American policymakers decide that the enemy can be deterred from
using his weapons of mass destruction even in the face of conventional
defeat. Both situations will be rare.
The third type of offensive mission will be traditional special
operations including unconventional warfare, direct action, special
reconnaissance, psychological operations, and civil affairs. In general,
Special Operations Forces will require less alteration of existing force
structure, equipment, and training to be of utility in the future
strategy than most other elements of the U.S. military.
The future strategy will also require a cluster of defensive
military missions such as immigration control, counterterrorism, force
protection during ecological and humanitarian missions, and
strategic-level protection against weapons of mass destruction. These
will often be performed in conjunction with other nations. Future
defensive missions will require changes in emphasis and doctrine within
the U.S. military. They must be seen as primary missions with strategic
significance rather than secondary functions designed to support
offensive actions. One of the priorities will be better integration of
U.S. intelligence assets. This will probably require some reorganization
of the intelligence community. The institutional separation of the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, for
instance, is a legacy of the cold war with little relevance in the new
security environment.
If our national security strategy remains focused on the Third
World, the dominant branches of the future U.S. Army are likely to be
Special Forces, Military Police, Military Intelligence, Aviation, and
Air Defense Artillery. Traditionally equipped armor, infantry, and field
artillery may play a role in the security of Europe, but have little
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utility in the Third World where likely opponents will be unable or
unwilling to fight conventional, combined-arms battles. If Europe
stabilizes, skill at large-unit combined-arms warfare will become less
vital for the United States. Proficiency in this area may come to rest
more on nostalgia than strategic necessity since, as John Keegan notes,
it is common for "exclusive military minorities" such as the Egyptian
Mamelukes, Renaissance European armored knights, Japanese samurai, and
post-World War I European horse cavalry to "cling to antique
skills-at-arms."102 The U.S. military will still need to retain its
technological edge to operate effectively in Third World conflict short
of war, but this will require radical changes in force structure and
doctrine.103
Military Intelligence, Military Police, Civil Affairs, and
Psychological Operations forces will be especially important for those
rare cases where national policy calls for the direct application of
force in the Third World. Direct applications, where the U.S. military
actually creates and sustains stability, were traditional for the Army
in the frontier days. The 20th century norm, however, has been a
Clausewitzean indirect application of force where the military--whether
conventional infantry, armor, and field artillery or Special Forces--was
used to influence the elites and decisionmakers of the enemy who, in
turn, controlled their populace. In the absence of meaningful authority
in the future Third World, the U.S. military may have to revert to the
direct role. After all, there is no use controlling the decisions and
perceptions of powerless leaders. This shift will require a substantial
refocus of doctrine, training, and leader development from the current
concentration on the indirect application of force. Phrased differently,
if the United States opts for engagement in the Third World, the U.S.
Army must look beyond the brilliant success of the Gulf War to its
distant past to relearn methods for creating political order out of
chaos.
Conclusions.
For the next decade, the Third World is likely to undergo a phased
transition. Initially nation-states will still remain the most important
political units and backlash states with large conventional militaries
will pose the greatest danger. As a result, the
conventionally-configured U.S. military will retain utility and, if a
frightened tyrant miscalculates, a variant of the Gulf War may ensue.
Eventually, though, the Third World will enter a new phase. The third
tier will disintegrate into ungovernability while nation-states and
conventional militaries decline in significance and, eventually, pass
from the scene entirely. Hopefully, the United States will have
undergone substantial strategic disengagement by this point. When
humanitarian and ecological relief is necessary, we can only be
effective if we have undertaken a radical restructuring of our security
forces. This includes not only reorganization and changed emphasis
within the military, but also alterations of the fundamental
relationship of the U.S. military and the nonmilitary elements of our
security and intelligence forces. To approach the security challenges of
the future with the ideas and organizations of the past will condemn us
to ineffectiveness.
These conclusions, of course, reflect a specific image of the
Third World's future. There is at least the possibility that current
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trends will change, that democracy and ecologically- sustainable
economic development will win out, that fragmentation can be resisted,
that viable alternative systems of personal meaning can be constructed,
and that cooperation rather than conflict will dominate. The key to a
positive future in the Third World would be the rise and rapid spread of
an alternative value framework and politico-economic system stressing
population control, ecological sanity, intergroup cooperation, and
deference to authority. Because of the extent of change needed and the
speed with which it must take place, such a new system would probably
have to take the form of a unifying religion, either a totally new one
or a mutation from an existing one. Only a religion can generate the
transformative power needed to change the course of the Third World's
future.
Given the American mindset, though, we tend to expect either
technology or U.S. activism to solve the profound problems of the Third
World. Both are chimeras. Americans should wish for a rosy future, but
not plan on it. Danger and chaos in the Third World are more likely. But
if some rosy future does come to fruition, American strategy must still
undergo radical transformation. Our objectives, the form and extent of
our engagement, and the requisite military force will be different, but
the extent of change the same. Whatever future scenario is used to
reform U.S. strategy in the Third World, the need for strategic
entrepreneurship remains.
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